Crime Penalty Enhancements), the penalty for wilfully certifying false earnings reports was set at a maximum of USD 5 million or a maximum imprisonment of 20 years or both.
Second, the question of whether certification of earnings numbers is value-relevant interests financial economists who study corporate finance. To theorists, it raises interesting issues of whether certification of earnings numbers is a credible signal. If it is a credible signal, is it credible because the cost of the signal is significantly higher for the CEO with low earnings transparency than it is for the CEO with high earnings transparency, and so the former does not find it worthwhile to mimic the latter (Spence (1973) )? What are these costs? Even if these costs are high, what is the probability that a CEO can be found guilty? Or is CEO certification of earnings a credible signal because certification of earnings numbers by CEOs attracts attention, and the CEO with low earnings transparency does not want that attention (Crawford and Sobel (1982) )? To empiricists, the creation of a new mechanism of corporate governance affords a clean opportunity to test in real time its value-relevance.
The null hypothesis of this paper is that this particular SEC order requiring CEOs and CFOs to certify their earnings numbers is not relevant to firm value. A cartoon from the cover of The Economist (Aug 17-23, 2002 ) brilliantly summarizes this hypothesis. We quote the CEO on the cover: "I swear...that, to the best of my knowledge (which is pretty poor and may be revised in future), my company's accounts are (more or less)
accurate. I have checked this with my auditors and directors who (I pay to) agree with me..." The reason for this skepticism is clear: why would swearing make any difference, considering that CEOs had always previously signed their financial statements knowing that lying constituted fraud? 2 The alternate hypothesis of this paper is that this particular SEC order is an important addition to the arsenal of corporate governance mechanisms because it makes CEO certification of earnings numbers a credible signal. Certification of earnings numbers is now a credible signal because the SEC order not only raised the costs of lying, but it also 3 Ball and Brown (1968) , and Fama et al. (1969) pioneered the classic event study methodology and, except, for minor modifications (see Salinger (1992) ), their methodology continues to be used. Cambell et al. (1997) provide an excellent exposition of the event-study methodology in Chapter 4 of their book.
4
increased the probability that a lying CEO can be found guilty by reducing the standard of proof.
The question of whether CEO certification of their earnings numbers is or is not credible ultimately has to be answered by the people who employ the CEO: the shareholders. To gauge what shareholders think, financial economics tells us to document how they trade. A classic methodology to analyze this is an event study. Assuming that the event -certification or the lack thereof -will be reflected in traded asset prices, a careful analysis of trading behavior and the price reaction during the event will tell us whether the shareholders consider certification (non-certification) to be good news (bad news) or no news at all.
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The first part of the paper documents what happens to the trades of the shares of firms that certify on their certification date, and to the trades of the shares of firms that do not certify by the deadline.
Considering that about ninety five percent of the firms certified in the last one week before Aug 14, 2002, the traditional event study methodology suffers from a clustering problem. We tackle this problem by using two different approaches suggested in the literature: the portfolio approach and the seemingly unrelated regressions approach. Both of these approaches reveal the same result -there is nothing unusual about returns around the certification date. We also find that there is nothing unusual about volatility of returns and volume of trade for certifiers around their certification date. Interestingly, we find that there is nothing unusual about returns, volatility of returns, or volume of trade even for non-certifiers around August 15, 2002.
We finally use a non-parametric test -the Corrado (1989) mean rank test -to confirm our findings from our above parametric tests. We obtain similar results. We conclude that certification of earnings numbers, or the lack thereof, is a non-event for both these types of firms.
The second part of the paper investigates why CEO certification of earnings is a non-event. If there is nothing unusual in returns, volatility of returns, or volume of trade during an event, this does not necessarily mean that the event is value-irrelevant. In a previous paper, Bhattacharya et al (2000) had also documented a non-event. They had laid out five possible reasons a non-event may occur. First, the sample 4 In the period 1970 to 1979, Huberman and Schwert (1985) document that 85 per cent of the news contained in a CPI announcement had been anticipated and was being reflected in the prices of Israeli indexed bonds. 5 In the period July 1994 through June 1997, Bhattacharya et al. (2000) documented that unrestricted insider trading caused stock prices in Mexico to fully incorporate the information before their public release. 6 The sample size in the classic Ball and Brown (1968) paper is 261, whereas the sample size in the classic Fama et al. (1969) paper is 940. 5 size could be small, and therefore the tests have no power. Second, the market may be inefficient, in which case there is no link between value-relevant events and stock prices. Third, the event may be value-irrelevant.
Fourth, though the event is value-relevant, there may be no price reaction because the market had anticipated the event. 4 Fifth, though the event is value-relevant, there may be no price reaction because insiders with private information about the event had traded with impunity in this market, and prices fully reflected the insider's information.
5
In our tests, the sample size is in the hundreds, which is similar to the sample size in typical event studies. 6 Further, unlike the tests of Bhattacharya et al (2000) of the Mexican stock market, our tests are for the largest U.S. firms in the U.S. stock markets; therefore, it could be reasonably assumed that markets are efficient. That leaves only two hypotheses to rule out: either the event is value-irrelevant or the event is value-relevant, but stock prices fully reflect the event. Note that stock prices could fully reflect the event either because the event was anticipated by the market, or insiders with private information about the event traded with impunity in this market.
The second possibility -the event is value-relevant but stock prices fully reflect the event -has two testable implications, one in time-series, and the other in the cross-section. The time-series implication is the following. If the event is value-relevant, but stock prices fully reflect the event, we should see information leakage before the event in a predictable manner: the certifiers (non-certifiers) should exhibit a significant stock price rise (price fall) from many days before the event till the event, when there is no more stock price rise (price fall). To be precise, the pre-event cumulative abnormal return (preCAR), which is a measure of the sign and the magnitude of news leakage, should rise (fall) for certifiers (non-certifiers) from many days before the event till the event, when there is no more rise (fall Our paper finds strong evidence that the event was anticipated by the market. A probit test of the predictability of who would or would not certify reveals strong predictability. Some variables that come out to be significant in predicting who would or would not certify are the following. Firms who did not certify are likely to be firms who restated their earnings in the past one year, are in distress (low free cash flow, low cash), have more agency problems (lower institutional shareholdings), and were likely to be audited by Arthur Andersen.
Our finding of predictability should not be surprising. The CEOs of these firms were ordered by the SEC to certify their earnings numbers and were expected to certify their earnings numbers. So the market was not surprised when they did certify. As for the firms that did not certify, as many of these firms were well-known "scandal" firms (like Enron and WorldCom), they were not expected to certify. They did not, and the market was not surprised that they did not.
What may be surprising, however, is that our paper fails to find any evidence supporting the testable implication of the hypothesis that the event is predictable by the market and is value-relevant. This is true both in the time-series and in the cross-sectional tests. In the case of time-series, we find that the preCAR of the certifiers does not rise significantly before the event. The preCAR of the non-certifiers does not fall significantly before the event; as a matter of fact, they rise significantly before the event. In the case of the cross-section, we find that almost all the 24 variables that the literature tells us are good predictors of who would or would not certify have no significant relationship with AR or preCAR. The most important finding of the cross-sectional tests is the poor explanatory power of the 24 independent variables; the adjusted R 2 is a paltry 2.9% (-0.1%) for the AR (preCAR).
We help, but neither did it hinder, the market's ability to differentiate further between these two types of firms.
All of the above evidence, therefore, favors the null hypothesis of this paper: this particular SEC order requiring CEOs and CFOs to certify their earnings numbers is not relevant to firm value.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section I describes our data. Some descriptive statistics, especially the difference in firm characteristics between certifiers and non-certifiers, is given here.
7 Because we have the largest US firms in our sample, we attempt to minimize their dominance by choosing an equally-weighted index instead of a value-weighted index. The usual choice would be the CRSP equally-weighted index. Unfortunately, the data for this index exists only till end 2001. So we choose the Value Line index. We have daily return and daily volume data for this index through August 2002. The Value Line index is an equally-weighted index, and it is made up of about 1700 stocks that are covered in the Value Line Investment Survey. However, despite the fact that this index is equally-weighted, our sample firms still make up a significant portion of its value. To test for the robustness of our results, we created our own equally-weighted index. This index that we created consisted of about 6,500 firms that are listed on the Datastream database for which there was I/B/E/S coverage. Daily returns and daily volume for each of these 6,500 firms were obtained over the period 1/1/1995 through 8
In section II we document the impact on trading behavior, or the lack thereof, of certification of earnings numbers. Some econometric issues are discussed here, as well as how we tackled these issues using three different methodologies. Section III explores why we find certification to be a non-event in the previous section. Section IV concludes.
I. Data and Descriptive Statistics

A. Data and their Sources
There were 940 firms listed in the SEC order 4-440, companies whose revenues were greater than USD We obtain data about the following firm-specific variables of interest for our sample of 762 firms:
a variable related to the industry (industry SIC code), variables related to size (sales, market capitalization and total assets), variables related to leverage (debt to equity ratio and debt to total assets ratio), a variable related to liquidity (cash), a variable related to the intangibility of assets (R&D expense), variables related to payout to equity holders (dividends and share repurchases), variables related to valuation (P/E ratio and market to book ratio), and variables related to profitability (return on equity and return on assets). We also obtain all relevant data needed to estimate another variable related to liquidity (free cash flow). Unless otherwise specified, these data are for the fiscal year that ended in 2001.
We obtain the following trading data for our sample of 762 firms: daily dividend adjusted return and daily volume. We also obtained data on the daily Value Line equally-weighted market index. 7 We obtain 8/31/2002, and the index was created. None of our results change when we use our equally-weighted index instead of the Value Line equally-weighted index as a market proxy. 9 these data to compute abnormal returns around the event date. These data are from January 1, 1996 to August 20, 2002.
We obtain the following data about the board of directors for our sample of 762 firms -the number of directors in the board, the fraction of the directors that are insiders, and whether the CEO and the chairperson is the same person -and we obtain the following data about ownership for our sample of 762 firms -number of shareholders, proportion of shares held by management, proportion of shares held by institutions, and proportion of shares held by shareholders whose individual holdings are 5% or more. Denis and McConnell (2002) , in a comprehensive survey of corporate governance around the world, point out that the board of directors and ownership structure are the two key internal corporate governance mechanisms.
According to them, the three board characteristics mentioned above, as well as the four ownership characteristics mentioned above, have been the most investigated in the literature. Hermalin and Weisbach (2002) review the US evidence on boards, whereas Holderness (2002) surveys the US evidence on ownership.
We hypothesize that CEOs in firms with better corporate governance, i.e., firms in which shareholder interests and management interests are better aligned, are more likely to exhibit higher earnings transparency, and so are more likely to certify their earnings numbers. The above are the reasons we obtain data for these seven corporate governance variables. These data are for the fiscal year ending 2001.
We obtain the following additional data for our sample of 762 firms -the dollar value of stocks underlying options granted to management as a proportion of total market capitalization, the number of research firms who follow this company, whether the company restated its earnings in 2002, and whether
Arthur Andersen was an auditor of this company. The reasons for obtaining these data were the following.
Option grants to managers may (the classical view) or may not (see, for example, Yermack (1997) ) align the interests of managers to that of shareholders. The effect of options on earnings transparency is, therefore, an empirical issue, and we would like to empirically document the link or the lack of a link. A firm with a large analyst following is likely to have more earnings transparency and, thus, the likelihood of certification of earnings numbers should be higher. The CEO of a firm which has restated its earnings may find it easier to certify the earnings numbers. Arthur Andersen, being the auditor of Enron and WorldCom, and now criminally indicted, may have audited a few more firms whose earnings are difficult to certify. These data, except for the cases mentioned above, are for the fiscal year ending 2001.
Some of these data are missing for some firms. The source of these data and the number of firms for which we have these data are given in the Appendix.
B. Descriptive statistics
Our primary sample are the 688 firms whose CEOs had to certify their firm's earnings numbers by 5:30PM on August 14, 2002. Table I compares these firms with the universe of all listed firms to find out if these firms were special. The findings are not surprising. The SEC had chosen the largest firms in terms of revenue, and we observe that. Not only do our primary sample firms have larger revenues than the average listed firm, but they also have a larger market capitalization, and a bigger asset base. The differences are statistically significant. Leverages of our primary sample firms are higher than the average listed firm, but not significantly so in a statistical sense. In terms of valuation, the P/E ratios of our primary sample firms are higher than the average listed firm, but not the market to book ratios, leading us to no definite conclusion about the market's view of their growth opportunities. Table II compares the certifiers with the non-certifiers in our primary sample. It seems that the non-certifiers are distressed firms with low market multiples (low P/E ratios and low market to book ratios) and negative free cash flow. It seems that the only corporate governance variable that is statistically significantly different is the proportion of institutional shareholders; non-certifiers have a significantly lower institutional shareholding. We will confirm these findings with a formal probit test later on. Table II also compares the certifiers with the early certifiers. It seems that firms which did not have to certify their earnings by August 14, 2002, but still did, were more profitable firms (as measured by return on assets) and had higher valuation multiples (as measured by market to book) than the firms that had to certify by August 14, 2002, and did certify. The findings with respect to the corporate governance variables are revealing. It seems that the early certifiers compared to the certifiers had better corporate governance: they had higher institutional shareholdings, they had fewer number of shareholders, the chances of their CEO also being their chairman was lower, and the size of their board was smaller. Interestingly, the early certifiers also gave fewer options to their top management than the certifiers gave. earnings numbers on the penultimate date. As a matter of fact, the CEOs of 654 firms (98%) certified their earnings numbers in the last week. We do not know the reason for this, but we suspect the reason is that the reputational benefits of early certification were outweighed by the costs of hasty certification for most firms.
The clustering of certification dates poses some challenges to the conventional method of doing event studies. We discuss these econometric issues and their resolution in the next section.
II. The Impact of CEO Certification of Earnings Numbers
We measure the impact of CEO certification or non-certification of earnings numbers by analyzing whether returns, volatility of returns, or volume of trade are abnormal around the date of certification for the certifiers or around the date when non-certification became common knowledge (August 15, 2002) for the non-certifiers.
The procedure for measuring abnormal returns (AR) is standard in the literature. An abnormal return is simply defined as the return over and beyond what would normally have happened. The classical methods to estimate a stock's normal return is the market model (how much would have been the return given that the market had a return, and that the stock's normal return is a linear function of the market return) and the constant-mean-return model (the stock's normal return is its mean return). We use the more popular market model in this paper, but when we cannot use the market model -for example, we cannot use the market model when the portfolio under observation is the market portfolio itself -we use the constant-mean-return model. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is defined as the abnormal return cumulated from some start date. As contrasted with the AR, which is a measure of information release during an event, the CAR is a measure of information leakage during a time period.
A. Eyeball tests
Henceforth, unless otherwise mentioned, we define as "certifiers" all firms who certified on or before Aug 14, 2002, whether they had to or not. "Non-certifiers" would be all firms who had to certify by August 14, 2002, but did not (they filed their own versions of certification, or failed to file anything).
Figure 2 shows cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in event time for both certifiers as well as noncertifiers. The CAR has been computed using the market model. The estimation period is 217 days before the event to 97 days before the event. As is standard, the event is labeled as the date 0. The event is the certification date for the certifiers and is August 15, 2002, for the non-certifiers. We follow the CAR from 75 days before the event to 10 days after the event. Notice that the CAR does not jump up for the certifiers around their date of certification, and the CAR does not jump down for the non-certifiers around their date of non-certification (taken to be August 15, 2002, the date non-certification became common knowledge).
The CAR of the non-certifiers, on the contrary, seems to be jumping up! These findings of a non-event are confirmed later by a formal test in Table V . Figure 3 shows normalized daily volatility in event time for both certifiers as well as non-certifiers.
We normalize daily volatility using two steps. First, an individual share's absolute return in a particular day is divided by its average daily absolute return, where the average is taken over 75 days before the event to 10 days after the event. Second, this normalized daily volatility for each share is averaged across all shares for each day in event time. Figure 3 plots this daily normalized volatility from day -75 to day +10. The plot hovers around 1, because the average normalized daily volatility over this time period is 1 by construction.
If CEO certification or non-certification of earnings numbers affects volatility of returns, we would expect to see a big spike around the event date (day 0) in Figure 3 . As can be seen, there is no such spike in the event window for either the certifiers or the non-certifiers. These findings of a non-event are confirmed later by a formal test in Table V . Figure 4 shows normalized daily volume in event time for both certifiers as well as non-certifiers.
We normalize daily volume using two steps. First, an individual share's daily volume in a particular day is divided by its average daily volume, where the average is taken over 75 days before the event to 10 days after the event. Second, this normalized daily volume for each share is averaged across all shares for each day in event time. In Figure 5 , we note that the CAR of the certifiers and the CAR of the market almost coincide, which signifies, not surprisingly, that information about large firms dominates all information. Note also that on June 27, 2002, the CAR of the firms that certified was already higher than the CAR of the firms that did not certify. This implies that the market had partially separated firms with good earnings transparency from firms with bad earnings transparency before June 27, 2002 (the day of the SEC order to certify). Finally note that there seems to be no sharp spikes in any of these three CARs in any of the three days. A formal test in Table   V reveals that this is not true for August 14, 2002, the date of the deadline.
In Figure 6 , note that the market is more volatile than either the certifiers or the non-certifiers. This is not surprising, considering that the certifiers and the non-certifiers are the large firms. An interesting point to note in this graph is that, though there is nothing unusual in volatility of returns for certifiers, non-certifiers, or the market in any of the three days under observation (confirmed later by a formal test in Table V) In Figure 7 , note that there is nothing unusual in daily trading volume of certifiers, non-certifiers, or the market in any of the three days under observation. A formal test in Table V reveals that this is not true for July 25, 2002, the day the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed by Congress.
B. Formal tests
We first check whether returns were unusual around the date of certification for the certifiers or around the date when non-certification became common knowledge (August 15, 2002) for the non-certifiers.
This means that the abnormal returns (ARs) or the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) must be aggregated across securities for us to make statistical inferences. In typical event studies, it is assumed that the abnormal returns on individual securities are uncorrelated in the cross-section, an assumption which is reasonable considering that event windows of the securities do not usually overlap. This is not true in our study. As can be seen in Figure 1 , there is severe clustering of events, and so it is expected that abnormal returns on individual securities are correlated.
Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) suggest two completely different approaches to deal with this econometric issue. We employ both of their suggestions.
B1. Parametric test -The Portfolio Method
The first method to handle clustering is the portfolio method. This method creates a portfolio of all stocks who share the same event date. After forming these portfolios, a security level analysis can be performed on the portfolio as a whole, which diminishes the error created by cross correlation in the error terms. To obtain a reasonable sample size, we created portfolios based around any date on which more than twenty certifications occurred. This occurred for six trading days: August 7, 8, 9, 12, 13 and 14. For those firms that did not certify with Form A, the event date was assumed to be August 15 th for our tests. The estimation period began 142 trading days prior to the certification, and lasted for 120 trading days.
The results are in Table III . We notice that on the day the SEC ordered the firms to certify -June 27, 2002 -their returns were not abnormal. Returns were not abnormal for the non-certifiers on August 15, 2002, the day after the deadline when it became common knowledge who had not certified. Returns were not abnormal for the certifiers on their day of certification. As certifications or non-certifications were sometimes announced a day later, we repeated all our tests by expanding our event window by one more day.
None of our results change. The last column in Table III , though not a formal test, does confirm our finding that there is nothing unusual in returns in the event date -the number of stocks beating the market are not significantly different than the number of stocks being beaten by the market.
B2. Parametric test -Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR)
The second method to handle clustering is to use seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). The basic approach is to run a multivariate regression model, where the dependent variable is the security's daily return and the independent variables are the market's daily return and dummy variables for the event dates. A F-test is used to check whether each stock's return on the event period is abnormal, and another F-test is used to check whether the average stock's return on the event period is abnormal. Versions of this method have been developed by Thompson (1983, 1985) , Malatesta and Thompson (1985) , and Collins and Dent (1984) .
We test two hypotheses about the coefficients from the seemingly unrelated regression system:
where r jt is the Tx1 time-series vector of daily returns to security j. D 2jt is the Tx1 time series vector of observations for a dummy variable that equals one on the day and the day after company j certified, and zero otherwise.
We test the following two hypotheses for the estimated regression coefficients for each of the two dummy variables from our model :
H1: the sum of the regression coefficients is equal to zero H2: all of the individual regression coefficients are equal zero
We test these two hypotheses by calculating F statistics of the full and constrained models. We perform these tests three times. We first use four sub-samples that include all randomly ordered companies that certified by August 14 th . The reason for using four sub-samples, each having approximately 180 companies (722 in total) is that the F test requires that each company has to have at least 2(J+1) observations.
In our case that would mean at least 1445 observations; some companies do not have that many observations.
Second, we test both hypotheses on the largest sample of companies (that certified by August 14) that have a sufficient number of observations. The sample size is 638 companies with more than 1273 observations.
Third, we test both hypotheses on a sample of companies that did not certify (we have data for 22 companies)
by August 14, 2002, but were required to. In the last case, the definition of the second variable changes; it equals one if the company j did not certify on August 14 and August 15, and zero otherwise. Table IV gives the results. The F-statistics in Column 1, which is a test of H1, are not significant
anywhere. This implies that, on an average, returns were not abnormal on June 27, 2002 (the day of the SEC order), returns were not abnormal on the date of certification for the certifiers, and returns were not abnormal for the non-certifiers at the time non-certification became common knowledge (August 14 and 15, 2002).
The F-statistics in Column 2, which is a test of H2, are significant everywhere. This implies that, though on an average returns were not unusual in any of these three days, some individual stocks did have unusually high or low returns on those three days.
B3. Non-Parametric test
We use a non-parametric test proposed in Corrado (1989) . This test does not make any distributional assumptions, focusing instead on the rank of the observations instead of their values. Corrado (1989) shows that this test statistic is well-specified, and is expected to be asymptotically normally distributed. We conclude this section by summarizing our main finding: certification or non-certification was a non-event. We explore the reason why in the next section.
IV. Why was there no impact?
A possible reason why CEO certification or non-certification of earnings numbers had no impact is because there was no surprise. The CEOs were ordered by the SEC to certify their earnings numbers and were expected to certify their earnings numbers. So the market was not surprised when they did certify. As for the firms that did not certify, as many of these firms were well-known "scandal" firms (like Enron and WorldCom), they were not expected to certify. They did not, and the market was surprised that they did not.
In other words, who would certify and who would not certify was predictable.
We do find strong evidence of predictability. We run a Probit test where the dependent variable is 1 for the certifiers and 0 for the non-certifiers. The independent variables are firm-specific variables related to the industry, size, leverage, liquidity, intangibility of assets, payout to equity holders, valuation multiples, and profitability. Other independent variables that we use are related to two key internal corporate governance mechanisms -composition of the board of directors (the number of directors in the board, the fraction of the directors that are insiders, and whether the CEO and the chairperson is the same person) and composition of firm ownership (number of shareholders, proportion of shares held by management, proportion of shares held by institutions, and proportion of shares held by shareholders whose individual holdings are 5% or more). Our other independent variables are related to CEO compensation, visibility of the firm, past restatement of earnings, and the quality of its auditor. The motivation for using all the above variables were described in Section I, and we do not repeat the discussion here.
The results of the Probit test are given in Table VI . We find that the probability of a CEO certifying the earnings numbers is positively linked to the firm's liquidity (where liquidity is measured as cash or free cash flow), and is positively linked to tangibility of assets (R&D expenses are negatively linked We need to make three points about our probit test. First, as we use 24 independent variables, multicollinearity may be a problem. We document that it is not. We estimate a Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
for detecting multi-collinearity; the VHF is less than the critical level of 20. Second, according to Green (1997, page 875), since different distributional assumptions underlie the probit and the logit models, it would be useful to test both these models, especially if there is extreme skewness in 1's and 0's, as exists here. As a robustness check, we ran a logit model using the same independent variables. The findings as well as the high value of goodness-of-fit were similar. This shows that certification and non-certification were predictable. Recall that we had seen this in Figure 5 as well. The CAR of the firms that certified was already higher than the CAR of the firms that did not certify on June 27, 2002 (the day of the SEC order to certify).
Third, we use the probit model to check whether the abnormal returns of firms that "go against type" are significant. This implies that we check the abnormal returns of firms that the probit model had predicted would certify but they actually did not -24 in our sample -and we check the abnormal returns of firms that the probit model had predicted would not certify but they actually did -10 in our sample. The idea behind this test is to check whether the former was a "bad news surprise" and the latter was a "good news surprise."
We do not find any surprises. The cumulative abnormal return in the period from day 0 to day 1 was 1.45% (t=0.555) for the former set, and 0.44% (t=0.461) for the latter set
We now point to evidence to show that though who would certify and who would not certify was predictable, the SEC regulation requiring certification was not value-relevant. We discuss both the timeseries as well as the cross-sectional evidence.
The time-series evidence has been given before. First, we had noticed in Figure 2 that the pre CAR of the certifiers did not rise significantly before the event, whereas the preCAR of the non-certifiers did not fall significantly before the event; as a matter of fact, they rose significantly before the event. This is against our predictions. If the event is value-relevant and predictable, we should see the certifiers (non-certifiers)
to exhibit a significant stock price rise (price fall) from many days before the event till the event, when there is no more stock price rise (price fall). Second, we had noticed in Figure 5 , that, before June 27, 2002 (the day of the SEC order to certify), the preCAR of the firms that certified was already higher than the preCAR of the firms that did not certify, which made us conclude that the market had partially distinguished between these two types of firms before June 27, 2002. What we did not mention before, but now we do, is that Figure   5 shows no change on June 27, 2002 in the difference between the preCAR of the firms that certified and the preCAR of the firms that did not certify. This implies that the SEC order of June 27, 2002, made little difference. The SEC order did not help, but neither did it hinder, the market's ability to differentiate further between these two types of firms.
The cross-sectional evidence is given in Table VII . We run three cross-sectional regressions. The first and second regressions assume that the event of certification was not hundred percent predictable and, therefore, certification or non-certification had some informational content. In the first regression, we assume that all this information came out on the event day, and so our dependent variable is the abnormal return on the event date, AR [0] . In the second regression, we assume that all this information came out on the event day and the day after, and so our dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return on those two days,
The third regression assumes that the event of certification was hundred percent predictable and, therefore, certification or non-certification had no informational content on the event day. However, the prediction must have taken place sometime in the past, and information must have come out when the market distinguished between both these types of firms. Not knowing when this happened, we use as our dependent variable the pre CAR from sixty days before the event to one day before the event, CAR [-60,-1].
The independent variables are the same variables we had used before in Table VI . The motivation for using these variables were described in Section I, and we do not repeat the discussion here. If certification is value-relevant, then the information that comes out when it is known who would or would not certify, should be linked to these independent variables. Table VII 2002. The purpose of our paper is to find out whether this particular regulation helped in any way to restore investor confidence that had been battered by the recent accounting scandals of Enron, WorldCom, etc.
Our finding is a negative finding. We document that certification was not only a non-event for the certifiers around their certification date, but it was also a non-event for the non-certifiers around Aug 15, 2002. A reason why this could have happened is because the market had become very sensitive to accounting irregularities, and had partially distinguished between firms with good earnings transparency and firms with bad earnings transparency. We provide corroborating evidence in favor of this predictability hypothesis.
However, we go on to document with cross-sectional and time-series evidence that the SEC order did not help, but neither did it hinder, the market's ability to differentiate further between these two types of firms.
This leads us to conclude that CEO certification of earnings numbers was, at best, a marginally valuable 
Table I Sample Statistics
Notes: The following summary statistics are based on information from the Compustat database, and firms are included in the sample if data could be found for the firm for the year 2001. Column one includes all firms required to certify their financial statements by August 14, 2002. Column two includes all firms listed in the Compustat database for which 2001 data could be gathered. Column three shows the probability estimate yielded from a two-tailed t-test for unequal, unpaired samples given the hypothesis H 0 : (1)=(2). The book values of debt and equity were used in the D/E ratio, while the market to book ratio was calculated by adding the market value of equity to the book value of debt, and then dividing the sum by the book value of the firm. The P/E ratio was calculated using 2001 earnings per share, and the price as of Dec. 31, 2001. (1) Firms required to certify by Aug. 14, 2002 Column three shows the statistics for those firms who, although not required to file until a later date, filed before the August 14 deadline. Columns four, five and six show the p-values from two-tailed t-tests for unequal and unpaired samples, with the hypothesis that both sample means are equal. Accounting information was taken from the Compustat database for the last fiscal year. Ownership variables reflect the portion of a firm's equity held by officers of the firm or institutional shareholders. The book values of debt and equity were used in the D/E ratio, while the market to book ratio was calculated by adding the market value of equity to the book value of debt, and then dividing the sum by the book value of the firm. The P/E ratio was calculated using 2001 earnings per share, and the price as of Dec. 31, 2001 . The compensation measure is the dollar value of the shares underlying both vested and non-vested options given to each firm's top management as reported in SEC filings, divided by the market capitalization of the firm. Information on board composition comes from each firm's financial reports and include the number of directors, the percent that are also officers of the firm, and whether the CEO is also the chairman of the board. The firm's auditor was obtained from financial reports, while the restatement variable came from a Lexis-Nexis search. Free cash flow was calculated as follows: Earnings before taxes + Depreciation and Amortization -CAPEX -Income taxes -Increase in Net Working Capital. ROA and ROE are net income divided by the total book value of assets and equity respectively for the 2001 fiscal year.
Required to Certify by August 14, 2002 14
Later Deadline
Market Variables
(1) Certified (2) Did not certify 
Table III Event study results -portfolio method
Notes: Abnormal returns were calculated for firm portfolios using standard event study methodology. Because of potential cross-correlation in the error terms, portfolios were formed based upon the event date, and the tests were performed on the portfolio abnormal return. The abnormal returns for the entire sample on June 27 were calculated using the constant means-return model. All other abnormal returns were calculated using the market model relative to the Value Line equally weighted market index. Listed in parentheses below the abnormal return are the t-statistics for the hypothesis H 0 : AR=0.. Column one shows the date the firms in the portfolio certified according to the SEC database. Column two shows the abnormal return on the event date, while column three has the cumulative abnormal return for the event date and the following trading day. Column four shows the percentage of firms in each portfolio that had a higher return than the market portfolio on the event date. Certifiers are firms who certified by August 14, 2002, whether they had to or not. Non-certifiers are firms who had to certify by August 14, 2002, but did not file a certification, or did not file the required Form A by that date. The initial tests includes 902 of 940 firms required to certify. The non-certifier sample includes 22 of 25 firms, while the firms certifying on August 14, 2002, includes205 of 230 firms. We did not have any missing data for the firms certifying on Aug 7, 8, 9, 12 or 13, 2002. Sample Portfolio We test the following two hypotheses for the estimated regression coefficients for each of the two dummy variables from our model :
We test these two hypotheses by calculating F statistics of the full and constrained models. We perform these tests three times. We first use four subsamples that include all randomly ordered companies that certified by August 14. The reason for using four sub-samples, each having approximately 180 companies (722 in total) is that the F test requires that each company has to have at least 2(J+1) observations. In our case that would mean at least 1445 observations; some companies do not have that many observations. Second, we test both hypotheses on the largest sample of companies (that certified by August 14) that have a sufficient number of observations. The sample size is 638 companies with more than 1273 observations. Third, we test both hypotheses on a sample of companies that did not certify (22 companies series arranged relative to each security's certification date), whereas Panel B has the results of tests performed in calendar time. All event time statistics in Panel A were calculated for the period beginning eighty trading days before the event and ending ten trading days after the event, whereas calendar time statistics were based on daily data over the period April 1, 2002 to August 30, 2002 . Abnormal returns in event time in Panel A was computed using the market model, whereas abnormal returns in calendar time in Panel B was computed using the constantmean-return model. Column one reports the results of a t-test which tests whether the daily value for the specified date was significantly different than the series mean. Columns two and three show the results of a Corrado (1989) is a Probit model with the same dependent variable but no independent variables included. Ownership variables reflect the portion of a firm's equity held by officers of the firm, institutional shareholders, and by shareholders with holdings greater than 5% of the firms outstanding shares. The book values of debt and equity were used in the D/E ratio, while the market to book ratio was calculated by adding the market value of equity to the book value of debt, and then dividing the sum by the book value of the firm. The P/E ratio was calculated using 2001 earnings per share, and the price as of Dec. 31, 2001 . The compensation measure is the dollar value of shares underlying both vested and non-vested options given to each firm's top management as reported in SEC filings, divided by the market value of the firm. Free cash flow was calculated as follows: Earnings before taxes + Depreciation and Amortization -CAPEX -Income taxes -Increase in Net Working Capital. ROA and ROE are net income divided by the total book value of assets and equity respectively for the 2001 fiscal year. We estimate a Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for detecting multi-collinearity; the VHF is less than the critical level of 20. Results from a regression where each firm's abnormal return at the date of filing is the dependant variable. (Aug. 15 was used as the event date if the firm did not certify.) White corrected t-statistics are given. Ownership variables reflect the portion of a firm's equity held by officers of the firm, institutional shareholders, and by shareholders with holdings greater than 5% of the firms outstanding shares. The book values of debt and equity were used in the D/E ratio, while the market to book ratio was calculated by adding the market value of equity to the book value of debt, and then dividing the sum by the book value of the firm. The P/E ratio was calculated using 2001 earnings per share, and the price as of Dec. 31, 2001 . The compensation measure is the dollar value of shares underlying both vested and non-vested options given to each firm's top management as reported in SEC filings, divided by the market value of the firm. Free cash flow was calculated as follows: Earnings before taxes + Depreciation and Amortization -CAPEX -Income taxes -Increase in Net Working Capital. ROA and ROE are net income divided by the total book value of assets and equity respectively for the 2001 fiscal year. We estimate a Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for detecting multi-collinearity in all the three regressions; the VHF is less than the critical level of 20 in all three. Figure two shows the accumulation of abnormal returns beginning seventy-five days before each firm's certification date, and continuing for ten days following the certification event. Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model, with the Value Line Index as the market proxy. Market model estimates come from the period beginning 219 days before the certification event, and ending ninety-seven days before the event. Abnormal returns for each stock is calculated by the following formula: AR it = K it -α i -β i K mt where K i is the return on security i on date t, and Km t is the market return on date t, and α and β are the estimates derived from the regression of the firms returns on the Value Line Index in the estimation period. Portfolio abnormal returns are then calculated by averaging the abnormal returns for each firm in the portfolio on the date relative to the event. This portfolio abnormal return in then added onto the sum of all previous daily abnormal returns to get the new cumulative abnormal return. Figure three shows normalized absolute price movements for the two portfolios over the period beginning seventy-five days prior to the event, and extending for ten days after the certification event. Values are calculated by taking the absolute value of each daily return for each firm in the portfolio. A mean is then calculated for each firm's absolute daily returns, and each daily absolute return is divided by the firm's mean. The portfolio's average normalized price movement for a day is then calculated by taking the average of daily normalized price movements for all firms in the portfolio for each day relative to the event date. The event period covers seventy-five days before the event, and continues for ten days after the certification period. Volume is normalized by calculating the mean volume for each firm over this period, and then dividing the firm's daily volume by its mean. The average normalized volume is then calculated cross-sectionally across all firms in the portfolio for each day relative to the date of the firm's certification.
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